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南沙群岛争端以对话缓解紧张 译自2004年6月28日东京《日本时报》

译者:刘智利(廊坊)


作者:罗纳德-罗德里格斯(RONALD A. RODRIGUEZ)

首发于光明观察,转载请注明译者及出处;本译文仅供参考,引用请查对原文。

檀香山(HONOLULU)
最近的事件证实南中国海的海上领土争端仍是东亚各国政府所面临的一个问题。文莱、中国、马来西亚、菲律、台湾和越南都声称全部或部分拥有对斯普拉特利群岛(即我南沙群岛译者注)的所有权。

仅在2004年第一季度,宣称拥有主权的各方就轮番制造不稳定局势,这使人们更加关注对现状的维持以及对2002年的《南中国海各方行动宣言》( 2002 Delaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea )
能否保证各方的自我约束。

首先,菲律宾在2月份宣布在南中国海与美国举行巴里卡丹(Balikatan)军事演习。菲律宾的行动似乎受到下述因素驱使,即中国考查船只和军舰在斯普拉特利群岛越来越多的探访,还有去年年底在无人占领的岛礁上新的中国标记物的突然出现,这些事件让马尼拉更加不安。这种加剧的紧张状态直到菲律宾总统格洛丽亚-马卡帕加尔-阿罗约(Gloria Macapagal Arroyo)向该地区保证军事演习与海上领土争端没有任何关系时才得以缓解。

然后轮到台湾。3月23日,台湾一艘快艇载着8人登陆Ban Than Reef小岛,并在岛上快速搭建一个临时观鸟站。越南强烈谴责了台湾的行为,并要求台湾方面停止搭建活动。越南外交部发言人黎勇(Le Dung)指责台湾的行动为一种抢夺土地的扩张行为,这种行为严重侵犯了越南的领土主权,并警告台湾要为其冒险行为承担一切可能的后果。

台湾的行动并非没有遭到回应。Ban Than Reef事件过后两天,越南宣布将把首批观光团送往这一有争议的岛屿,目的在于重申该国对东沙和西沙群岛的主权。中国则决定4月12日在南中国海举行一次海军演习,给其它各方发出令其放弃的信号。

中国在南中国海海军力量的展示未能阻止越南的行动。相反,河内4月19日给载有60名游客和40名官员的白色海军船只HQ988发出了起程前往南沙群岛的信号。很多人把这次引发争议的8天往返旅行视为越南在这一地区更多旅游活动的开始--它是效法几年前马来西亚的一次跃进。

有关国家为了获得优势而采取各种策略的做法暴露了这份不具约束力的宣言(《南中国海各方行动宣言》)的脆弱性。2002年11月,东盟和中国在金边(Phnom Penh)签署了具有里程碑意义的宣言。在宣言中,宣称对斯普拉特利群岛拥有主权的各方同意避免采取可能会加剧南中国海紧张局势的行动。但这份宣言不具约束力的特性一直是令某些签署国担忧的问题。如今在宣言签署近两年之后,有关各方几乎又回到了它们开始时的状态。大多数国家,即使不是全部,似乎不准备允许地区性的利害关系替代它们的国家利益。至少在一些批评者看来,这就是为什么宣言已经沦为一张无价值的废纸的原因。

目前对这份宣言的价值有两种观点。总部设在檀香山的美国东西方中心的海洋政策专家马克-巴伦西亚(Mark Valencia)是怀疑论者的代表。他预言宣言注定要失败,因为宣言在试图减少南中国海领土争端的烈度方面本身存在着缺陷。这一观点认为,宣言并没有给该地区的安全形势带来深刻的变化,只不过是一次满足东盟渴望政治成就的自欺欺人的演练。巴伦西亚强调,任何松散的协定都不可能防止有关国家在这场久拖未决的争端中采取策略性的立场。

另一种观点更为谨慎。例如,菲律宾大学亚洲中心的艾琳-巴维耶拉(Aileen Baviera )警告不要急于对宣言作出判断并彻底地抛弃宣言,他主张各方要不断地参考宣言,无论什么时候出现问题,都建议各方要继续根据宣言的精神发现其价值和目的。从这种意义上来说,宣言具有参考价值,可以使争端各方的行动更加温和。菲律宾和中国将各自的海军演习低调处理为一种定期的安全常规演习或是与海上领土争端无关的一种演习,这种做法与它们以往更加自信的立场相比就是一个明显的转变。

但是,台湾和越南最近的行动不能被轻视。目前应当是重新估价宣言和留意怎样避免类似事件发生的时候了。为此,各方应开始建立一系列指导原则,旨在减少宣言中的灰色地带。宣言应该确定各方一致同意的10项要点,并且想办法使它们得以尽快实施。对宣言日益增多的批评应当能够推动人们对更具约束力的协议更大的兴趣。

另外,各方应该在地区合作的前景上拟定协议,这种地区合作正如中国决定在2003年10月8日和东盟签署的《友好合作条约》一样。这一条约不仅使东盟和中国对一项互不侵犯条约作出承诺,而且它也增加了未来在南中国海达成更具约束力的协议的可能性。

持乐观观点的人和怀疑论者都认为,对话是解决南中国海争端的最基本的需要。但任何新的倡议都应当强调推动合作的必要性,而不是仅仅停留在对违规行为的处理上。各方可以开始在宣言中提议的6个区域进行合作,这包括海上环保、海上科学研究、海上航行和通讯安全、搜寻和援救工作以及与跨国犯罪斗争。

台湾将继续是个问题。到目前为止,中国一直拒绝允许台湾在关于南中国海的任何合法协议中充当签约者。然而任何对台湾利益的忽视将会使其扮演破坏者的角色。争端的和平解决需要有效地处理台湾问题。

从事后之见来看,缺少持久的对话很可能会削弱了宣言存在的基础。各方忽视了这一事实,即连续的互动是和已签署的宣言同等重要的因素。当一个非正式工作组仍然在召集各方的时候,像加拿大和印度尼西亚这样起帮助作用的国家,以及象贾拉(Hasjim Djalal,印尼前驻德国大使译者注)这样的关键人物逐渐退出,这已经产生了一定的影响。

各方可能不会欣然同意,但是南中国海似乎需要另一个调解者。那么他会是谁呢?

罗纳德-罗德里格斯(RONALD A. RODRIGUEZ),菲律宾外交学院国际关系和战略研究中心东北亚项目和安全与战略研究项目的负责人,目前是太平洋论坛的法兹研究助理员(Vasey Fellow )。太平洋论坛是战略暨国际研究中心(CSIS)设在檀香山的美国智囊机构。以上是他的个人观点。


附原文及网址:

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?eo20040628a1.htm

Spratly Islands DISPUTE
Deflate tension with dialogue

By RONALD A. RODRIGUEZ
Special to The Japan Times

HONOLULU -- Recent events confirm that maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea remain an issue for East Asian governments. Ownership of the Spratly Islands is claimed, in whole or in part, by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.

In the first quarter of 2004 alone, the claimants took turns building up anxiety, raising concerns about the sustainability of the status quo and whether the 2002 Delaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea could ensure the claimants' self-restraint.

First came the Philippines' announcement of the Balikatan exercises with the United States in the South China Sea in February. The Philippine action appeared to be driven by Manila's growing uneasiness over an increasing number of visits by Chinese research vessels and warships in the Spratly Islands, as well as the sudden appearance of new Chinese markers on the unoccupied reefs late last year. The mounting tension did not dissipate until Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assured the region that the military exercises did not have anything to do with the maritime territorial disputes.

Then came Taiwan's turn. On March 23, a Taiwanese speedboat carrying eight individuals landed and carried out the swift construction of a makeshift "bird-watching stand" on the Ban Than Reef. Vietnam strongly condemned Taiwan's move and demanded an end to the construction activities. Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Le Dung branded Taiwan's handiwork "an act of land-grabbing expansion that seriously violated Vietnam's territorial sovereignty" and warned of possible consequences from Taiwan's "adventurism."

Taiwan's action didn't go unanswered. Two days after the Ban Than Reef incident, Vietnam reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Truong Sa (Spratly) and the Hoang Sa (Paracel) atolls by announcing that it would hold the inaugural tourist boat trip to the contested islands. China decided to conduct a Navy drill in the South China Sea on April 12, sending signals to the other claimants to back off.

The Chinese display of naval capability in the South China Sea didn't stop Vietnam. Unfazed, Hanoi gave its white navy ship HQ988 the go signal to sail for the atolls with about 60 tourists and 40 officials on April 19. Many saw the controversial eight-day round trip as the beginning of more Vietnamese tourism activities in the area -- a development that follows the Malaysian lead of a few years ago.

The maneuvering for advantage in the South China Sea reveals the frailty of the nonbinding declaration. In November 2002, the region celebrated the signing in Phnom Penh of the landmark declaration between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China in which the claimants agreed to avoid actions that could raise tension in the South China Sea. The nonbinding nature of the declaration, however, has been a concern for some of the signatories. Two years after it was signed, the parties are almost back to where they started. Most, if not all, do not seem ready to allow regional concerns to supersede their national interests. This is why, at least for some critics, the declaration has been reduced to a "flimsy piece of paper."

There are two views on the value of the declaration. Mark Valencia, an ocean policies expert at the Honolulu-based East-West Center, typifies the skeptic's view. He anticipated that the declaration was doomed, considering it a flawed attempt to reduce the heat over territory in the South China Sea. This view sees the declaration to be a self-deceiving exercise that satisfied ASEAN's thirst for political accomplishment, but did not offer profound changes in the security situation in the South China Sea. Valencia emphasizes that no loose agreement would prevent claimants from positioning themselves strategically in the lingering dispute.

The other view takes a more cautious position. Aileen Baviera of the University of the Philippines' Asian Center, for instance, cautions against a rush to judgment and outright dismissal of the declaration, arguing the claimants' constant reference to it whenever there is a problem suggests that parties continue to find value and purpose in its spirit. In this sense, the declaration has value as a referent, and modifies the behavior of the parties to the dispute. The Philippines' and China's efforts to downplay their navy drills as either part of a regular security routine or unrelated to the maritime territorial disputes indicate a turnaround in their more self-assured positions of the past.

Recent moves by Taiwan and Vietnam cannot be downplayed, however. It's time to reassess the declaration and see how similar incidents can be avoided. For one, the parties should start molding a set of guidelines that will diminish the gray areas in the declaration. The declaration should define the 10 points that the parties have agreed on and seek strategies to put them into operation them as soon as possible. The mounting criticisms of the declaration should create momentum for greater interest in a more binding agreement.

In addition, the parties should build on the prospects for regional cooperation that emerged out of China's decision to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN on Oct. 8, 2003. Not only does the treaty commit ASEAN and China to a nonaggression pact, but it also increases the possibility of a more binding agreement on the South China Sea in the future.

Optimists and skeptics share the view that dialogue is a basic need in the South China Sea. But any fresh initiative should emphasize the need for progress in cooperative endeavors, rather than dwell on infractions. The parties can begin with the six proposed areas of cooperation in the declaration, which include marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety of navigation and communications at sea, search and rescue operation and combating transnational crime.

Taiwan will continue to be a problem. To date, China has refused to allow Taiwan to become a signatory to any legal accord in the South China Sea. Yet any failure to consider Taiwan's interests will enable it to play spoiler. A peaceful resolution to the disputes requires effective management of the Taiwan problem.

In hindsight, it was probably the lack of sustained dialogue that has weakened the foundations of the declaration. The parties overlooked the fact that continuous interaction is an equally important element of the signed declaration. While an informal working group still convenes, the gradual retreat of catalysts like Canada and Indonesia, as well as key individuals like Hasjim Djalal, has had an impact.

The parties may not readily agree, but it appears that the South China Sea needs another intermediary. Takers anyone?

Ronald A. Rodriguez, head of the Northeast Asia program and officer in charge of the security and strategic studies program at the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies, Foreign Service Institute of the Philippines, is currently a Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, a U.S. think tank based in Honolulu. These are his personal views.

The Japan Times: June 28, 2004

文章来源:译者赐稿